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2 The model
Let us consider two regions, or two countries, north, n, and south, s. Both regions are inhabited by
L unskilled workers. Moreover, H skilled workers are interregionally mobile. Following Baldwin
et al. [1], we adopt the following normalizations for the number of workers: H = 1 and L =
(1−µ)/(2µ). As usual, µ represents expenditure share on manufacturing or industrial goods, with
0 < µ < 1. We notice that every time we use suﬃx r, r = n, s, and that if both r and v are used
in the same expression, r, v = n, s and r 6= v.
Each worker j, skilled or unskilled, consumes a traditional (or agricultural) homogenous good,
and many varieties of a modern (or manufactured, industrial) good, which are partly locally
produced and partly imported. Preferences, identical for all workers, are described by the following
utility function
U(Qmjr, Qajr) = QµmjrQajr
1−µ (1)
where Qajr is the traditional good consumption by individual j in r, and Qmjr is the modern
composite good consumption, which includes all locally produced and imported varieties. The
composite manufacturing good, Qm, is obtained by the aggregation of all industrial varieties i
produced by nr firms in region r, and nv firms in region v, with
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σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any pair of industrial varieties. Moreover, we remind
that ρ = σ−1σ represents an inverse measure of preference intensity for variety in the consumption
of manufactured goods. Each worker in region r maximizes (1) given the budget constraint:
pmrQmjr + parQajr = yjr (3)
where pmr and par are, respectively, the price of the composite industrial good and of the agri-
cultural good in region r, while yjr is jth worker’s income in r. As usual, all firms in a particular
region are symmetric. With iceberg costs for the industrial goods, τ have to be shipped in order
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to sell one unit of them in the other region. Therefore, the industrial price index in region r is
pmr =
¡
nrp1−σr + nvτ1−σp1−σv
¢ 1
1−σ (4)
From now on, following Baldwin et al. [1], we define φ = τ1−σ, with φ ∈ [0, 1]. φ is a measure of
the “freeness” of trade, with φ equal to zero when trade costs are infinite, to one when they are
null, and with φ that increases when trade costs decrease.
As usual, utility optimization yields demand for variety i produced in region r
Qmir = p−σr
µ
1
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φEmv
¶
(5)
where Emr and Emv are, respectively, expenditures on industrials goods in region r and in region
v. Let us define wh as skilled workers’ wage, wl as unskilled workers’ wage and πi as profits of firm
i. Then, solving the utility maximization problem for each worker and aggregating expenditure
on industrial goods in region r, we obtain regional expenditure on manufacturing goods
Emr = µ (whrHr + wlrL+ nrπir) (6)
Expenditure levels in the agricultural good in region r and v, Ear and Eav, are derived in a similar
way
Ear = (1− µ) (whrHr + wlrL+ nrπir) (7)
Skilled workers are interregionally mobile and employed in the production of industrial varieties.
Unskilled workers are not mobile and they are employed in the production of the agricultural good.
To produce one unit of the traditional good, one unit of unskilled worker is employed. Therefore,
with perfect competition, each region r produces Qar = L units of the traditional good. This
good is homogeneous and it is exchanged without trade costs. Therefore, its price must be equal
in the two regions, and, given that it is chosen as the numéraire, we have that
wlr = wlv = par = pav = 1 (8)
Each industrial variety is obtained with increasing returns to scale, which are internal to firms and
derive from a fixed cost of production. Specifically, to produce Qmir units of the ith variety, firms
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have to employ β/ar units of skilled workers for each unit produced, and α units of skilled workers
independent of the production level. The variable cost may diﬀer between the two regions, given
that ar may be diﬀerent from av. Parameter ar may be used as a measure of skilled workers
productivity in a particular region. Obviously, if region r is more productive than v, then ar > av.
Hence, the Hmir workers required by the ith firm to produce Qmir units of the industrial goods
are
Hmir = α+
β
ar
Qmir (9)
The cost function for each firm i in region r is
TCmir = whr(α+
β
ar
Qmir) (10)
Notice that the average production cost is decreasing in regional productivity level ar. Moreover,
for α and β we adopt the following normalizations: α = 1/σ and β = (σ − 1)/σ.4 Each firm
maximizes its profits by taking the price indices pm as given, and sets the mill price pr with a
mark up over the marginal production cost
pr =
σβ
(σ − 1) ar
whr =
whr
ar
(11)
with the price paid by consumers located in region v equal to
pv = τpr
Profits realized by each firm i in region r are
πir =
whr
σ
µ
Qmir
ar
− 1
¶
(12)
From the previous expression we know that each firm i in region r produces
Qmir =
σarπir
whr
+ ar (13)
4 We follow Puga [12].
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The industrial good market is imperfectly competitive, and it is characterized by a free entry and
exit assumption for firms. Therefore, profits must be null in equilibrium, and the equilibrium
production level for each firm in r is
Q∗mir = ar (14)
The equilibrium production level is higher, the higher the regional skilled workers’ productivity
level is. Increases in workers’ productivity levels are translated not only in increases of produced
quantities, but also in regional production competitiveness levels, given that for a given wage
rate, manufactured goods’ prices decrease. Finally, we notice that if region r has a higher skilled
workers’ productivity level, with ar > av, then it has a comparative advantage in the production
of the manufacturing sector.
Equating (13) and (5), and substituting manufacturing expenditure values in both regions
when profits are null from (6) and (7), we obtain the following equilibrium condition for each
industrial variety
ar = p−σr µ
·
1
p1−σmr
(whrHr + L) +
1
p1−σmv
φ (whvHv + L)
¸
(15)
Since skilled workers are interregionally mobile and never unemployed, it must be verified that
Hr +Hv = H = 1 (16)
Skilled workers’ real wages in r, 'r, are
'r =
whr
pµmr
(17)
Finally, we observe that total incomes produced in both regions r and v are, respectively,
Yr = Hrwhr +
(1− µ)
2µ
and Yv = (1−Hr)whv +
(1− µ)
2µ
(18)
As we can observe, the model so far described is the one proposed by Krugman [6], which has been
modified in order to take into account potential interregional technological diﬀerences in skilled
workers productivity levels when ar 6= av.
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The model is completed by the description of how regional productivity levels are determined.
Equations that describe the values of ar and av need to be continuous and diﬀerentiable around the
symmetric equilibrium. Moreover, in the symmetric equilibrium both regions must be perfectly
identical, because they are described by the same parameter values, and they have the same
endogenous variable values. Particularly, in the symmetric equilibrium mobile workers and firms
are uniformly distributed between the two regions, with Hr = Hv = 1/2, and regional productivity
levels are equal, with ar = av = a.
Following Krugman [8] we assume that labour productivity levels depend on the number of
workers employed in a particular region. Particularly, we assume that regional productivity level,
ar, is a function of skilled worker density, Hr, with
ar = f(Hr) (19)
If skilled workers are uniformly distributed between the two regions, the productivity levels are
equal with ar = av = a = 1.5
Let us start from the symmetric equilibrium where ar = av = f(1/2) = 1. Equation (19)
tells us that if a certain number of skilled workers moves from the north to the south, the south-
ern productivity level increases and, on the contrary, the northern productivity level decreases.
Moreover, around the symmetric equilibrium it must be the case that for each region r
∂ar
∂Hr
¯¯¯
Hr=Hv= 12 = κ (20)
Geographically localized externalities may have diﬀerent sources. They may have positive
nature, with κ > 0, if they derive from knowledge spillovers processes or learning by interacting
processes that foster higher productivity levels where workers density is higher. Vice versa, they
may also have a negative nature, with κ < 0, if they derive from phenomena of congestions or of
5 Note that we normalize to 1 regional productivity levels when skilled workers are uniformly distributed.
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coordination problems. However, these interactions may be more complex with decreasing returns
of regional productivity levels that may appear when workers density is suﬃciently high, as shown,
for instance, in figure 1, where we represent productivity levels, ar and av, as a function of regional
skilled workers density, Hr.6
Insert figure 1 about here
3 Centripetal and centrifugal forces in the core-periphery
equilibrium
In this section we evaluate the sustainability of full agglomeration equilibria of the modern sector
in one region and we discuss how diﬀerent parameters concur in the determination of the intensities
of centripetal and centrifugal forces at work.
As usual, the agglomeration of all firms in region v is a sustainable equilibrium only if the
ratio between the sales that a firm could realize by relocating its production in region r, Qmir,
and those required to break even, Q∗mir, is smaller than 1, that is if:
Qmir
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¸
< 1 (21)
Expression (21) is derived considering the case in which real wages of skilled mobile workers are
equal in the two regions in order to give them the incentive to work in both regions. It is well
known that an expression similar to (21) can be derived if we assume that firms produce quantities
that correspond to null profits, that is long run equilibrium quantities, and we examine if skilled
workers have any incentive to move from the core v to the periphery r. Particularly, skilled workers
do not move towards the periphery r when their real wage in the periphery r is smaller than in
the core v. Therefore, the core periphery outcome with agglomeration in v is sustainable when
'σhr = aσµv
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< aσµv = 'σhv (22)
6 The function for ar is ar = 1 + 0.2Hr(1 −Hr)(Hr − 1/2), and for av is av = 1 + 0.2Hv(1−Hv)(Hv − 1/2)
with Hv = 1−Hr.
9
